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In much the same way that Burke and Santayana noted that those who cannot remember the 
past are bound to repeat it, Maria Duffy in Paul Ricoeur’s Pedagogy of Pardon suggests 
that those who do not meaningfully confront the past are bound to a fractured future. Duffy 
situates her work within the peace process of Northern Ireland and the reconciliation 
projects of South Africa (as part of the larger movement of Truth Commissions). She 
contends that the hermeneutical arc, as developed in Ricoeur’s latter writings, and the 
evangelical tradition have the potential to lead to a transfiguration capable of forging new 
relationships in communities raw from historical conflict. Duffy connects the idealized 
solicitude elucidated in Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another with John Paul II’s call for the 
purification of memory (Incarnationis mysterium) as post-conflict societies seek 
reconciliation and hopeful futures. As she states throughout the work, risk and time 
inevitably intervene to dissuade us from authentically entering the praxis of pardon. The 
hope, however, remains that the message of Leviticus 19:18 can find its voice post-conflict 
relationships. The eschatological message of hope, reconciliation, and love buoys Paul 
Ricoeur’s Pedagogy of Pardon. Quoniam, the Pedagogy of Pardon will find limited 
resonance; however, her argument provides other opportunities for historical and 
philosophical discussion that warrant its inclusion in multi-disciplinary studies. 
 
Duffy links the potential of narrative theory to the theological and ethical as the “theology 
of memory” necessarily takes evil as the starting point.1 Ricoeur calls the suffering 
community to engage the past critically, to risk a dynamic narrative exploration, and 
ultimately to work toward reconciliation. Within Pedagogy of Pardon, Northern Ireland and 
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South Africa lend special alacrity to the call. In the wake of the Troubles and apartheid, 
institutional (such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa) and 
private/communal movements (oral histories, collected writings and reflections, etc.) have 
arisen to redress past excesses and provide some measure of healing. Though formal 
structures work to illuminate wrongs, Duffy warns that the utility of such formal structures 
make them ultimately inadequate to the task, for such structures risk their work being 
appropriated by the past presented as present with reconciliation sacrificed to punishment 
and denial. Here Duffy indirectly points to Ricoeur’s ideal of communities bound by shared 
moral values as opposed to those imposed by juridical institutions. While the need for 
pragmatic structure inevitably insinuates itself upon the peace process, the process remains 
incomplete without the “generous gift.”2 
 
Chapter One introduces the philosophical and theological content of Duffy’s argument. 
Duffy’s exploration of Ricoeur’s journey reflects a man deeply troubled by conflict and a 
need initiate praxis whereby the actor achieves self-esteem and, by extension, reciprocity 
and communion. The suffering fractured human works toward wholeness through the 
discovery of narrative identity. Narrative as understood by Duffy, then, seeks “to achieve a 
more human presentation of the person through an integration of reason and passion.”3 The 
connection between Ricoeur’s thought in Oneself as Another and Christian theology 
connect at this point. Ricoeur’s idealized solicitude necessitates equanimous dealings of Self 
and Other, which Duffy will connect to evangelical imperatives and from which justice can 
emerge. The presence of Hauerwas here is unmistakable. As Hauerwas has written, the 
Christian community, like the more secular version presented by Ricoeur, forms narratively 
and one cannot separate that community from its ethic.4 Because of the contextual nature of 
community in the Ricoeurian sense, the task for Hauerwas (and Duffy by extension) 
becomes one of action rather than system (the narrative community as doing rather than the 
community as a static corpus). True justice is not to be understood as that which is imposed 
through institutions or reason divorced from temporality upon the individual, but rather 
justice belongs to human beings bound through reciprocity and open to potentially 
meaningful futures.  
 
In Chapter Two, “Ethical Being,” narrative becomes the medium through which the human 
being begins his or her journey toward that ethical community. Duffy begins by examining 
and tying Aristotle’s narrative framework (Mythos, Mimesis, Catharsis, Phronesis, Ethos) 
to Ricoeur’s thought. In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur understood mythos in terms of the 
dynamic act of emplotment. Multifarious events become intelligible through emplotment 
and Ricoeur’s tripartite understanding of mimesis. As Duffy shows, mimesis for Ricoeur is 
a constructive, creative process. Crucially for Ricoeur, mimesis “…is the operation of 
organizing the events into a system, not the system itself.”5 Mimesis 1 seeks to understand 
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the nature of human action, or prefiguration. Mimesis 2 relates directly to emplotment, 
“…the operation that draws a configuration out of a simple succession.”6 Finally, narrative 
achieves its full promise through Mimesis 3, where text and human subject meet in creative 
praxis. Crucial in the context of confronting violent and silent histories, Aristotle’s structure 
opens the plot and makes imaginable that which has been hidden or ignored.7   
 
Key to Duffy’s argument, the discussion of Aristotle and Ricoeur prefigure two points. 
First, catharsis becomes the stage through which the silences of the narrative can be 
redressed through empathy, thus opening the path to phronesis. Second, phronesis 
represents the ethical fruition of the storied self. For Ricoeur, the historical and ethical 
cannot be disentangled. We are formed temporally, configure and reconfigure our 
understanding with introspection and attention to what is (and, importantly, what is not) in 
the text, and arrive at the “good life” properly understood in terms of Ricoeur’s concepts of 
self-esteem and solicitude. Duffy’s use of perichoretic in describing the ethical culmination 
of the storied person has significance, leading to a discussion of love and justice.8 Duffy 
sees Ricoeur as the bridge between the dynamic tension of love, as a “supra-ethical” 
concern, and justice, understood in the sense of distribution and equality. Both presuppose 
solicitude, for justice cannot exist without esteem for the other, and, similarly, love becomes 
meaningless without the other. Resplendent love, buttressed by justice, holds the promise of 
the reconciliation of fractured lives. 
 
By Chapter Three, Duffy has provided both the immediacy and the framework for a deeper 
evaluation of reconciling brutal pasts. Again, Ricoeur’s use of Aristotelian mirrored his 
concern to narratively construct history as a tonic against “bad” memory, which demands an 
ethical commitment. The spirit of self-esteem and solicitude guide the engagement. The 
storied person emerges as he or she becomes capable of authentically remembering, 
lamenting, and bringing forth that which has been silenced or unresolved in the past. Failure 
to meaningfully deal with the past, warts and all, inevitably taints the present and future. At 
the level of the individual, community, and the political, memory may ultimately be an act 
of mourning through which one may be healed through acceptance and understanding. 
Collective memory needs to be ethically engaged at the risk of old or contrived wrongs 
limiting the future or selective memory poisoning forgiveness and its therapeutic potential. 
Infused with Christian imagination, conscientious memory leads to a justified hope of a 
positive influence upon social and political institutions. Ricoeur’s continued effort to 
reformulate his theory of memory and forgiveness, especially in his later years, entailed a 
search for deeper metaphors of sin, suffering, and ultimately redemption.  Through Duffy, 
“the narrative imagination can be interpreted as a ‘perichoretic’ space of hospitality” in 
which hopeful futures can emerge affectively engaged memory.9 
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Ultimately, community as understood in the Ricoeurian sense confronts juridical process. In 
Chapter Four, Duffy seeks to demonstrate how the contextualized consensus of Ricoeur can 
temper mundane (and fragile) processes that seek to address and redress wrongs of the past. 
Commissions, hearings, etc. serve as forums (though always at risk of supporting the status 
quo and allowing vehement grievances to be voiced by those eager to find a sounding 
board) through which injustice may be revealed, silences brought forward, victim and 
perpetrator acknowledged, and catharsis may be explored, but the process remains 
incomplete and peace insecure without the superabundant role of love. For Duffy, for true 
healing to occur “…we have to be able to consider [hurt memories] from a distance, the 
stage upon memories of the past are invited to make an appearance, if we are to truly claim 
them as our own, in order to be unbound from them eventually.”10  
 
For Ricoeur, hermeneutics relies upon distanciation, or separation. Duffy uses An 
Crann/The Tree and The Healing through Remembering Project as examples of ways in 
which hurt memories may be brought to light and engaged. A critical point need to be 
addressed. Duffy’s earlier discussion of Zakor! stresses conscientiously dealing with the 
suffering of the past via remembrance made tangible in the oral histories (which can be 
extended to slave narratives in the United States, post-conflict narratives in Northern 
Ireland, post-apartheid narratives, etc.). As the testimony of historical actors enters narrative 
form, hermeneutics begins. Discourse places the speaker within a nexus of circumstances 
until the speech act is separated by the act of inscription, at which point the written (versus 
the spoken) word gains a degree of semantic autonomy. Echoing Heidegger, Ricoeur wrote 
that “Only writing, in freeing itself, not only from its author, but from the narrowness of the 
dialogical situation, reveals this destination of discourse as projecting a world.”11 The 
autonomy works on four levels of distance: the distance between the event and its perceived 
significance; the distance between the “from whom” and the “to whom;” the distance 
between the subjective world as experienced and a world that can be meaningfully 
reconstructed; and the distance between a situated, biased self and a self capable of 
appropriation) At the most visceral level, distance opens that place of reflective 
interpretation deepens understanding and solicitude, and moves the acting being beyond 
ultimately destructive prejudice.  
 
For Duffy, however, distanciation collides with a living, corrosive memory in the wake of 
the Troubles and apartheid, so the question becomes one of immediacy. The pedagogy of 
pardon, then, first needs to be situated in a milieu where conflict is truly over, the 
community has consensually devised methods for dealing with the past, and a “generosity 
of spirit” is present.12 Within such a framework, praxis takes Ricoeur’s form of the 
reflective interpretation whereby the balance between the deontological and the 
contextualized is achieved. “The articulations that we never cease to reinforce between 
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deontology and teleology find its highest—and most fragile—expression in the reflective 
equilibrium between the ethics of argumentation and considered convictions.”13 Considered 
convictions point to attestation. Attested being has the power to act, to engage ethically. At 
the level of discourse and argumentation, the sharing of histories, sufferings, and careful 
reflection on narratives, all require open and actively engaged being. “Such a mechanism 
will help to distinguish between ‘good and bad history’ and by implication, between good 
and bad memory.”14  
 
As beings thrown into the world and inextricably linked to the lives of others, appropriation 
opens the future and eases the inevitable alienation of our existential condition. 
Reconciliation as a necessary precondition of an open future becomes Duffy’s focus in 
Chapter Five. To this end, we turn to the reconciling capacities of the sacred and the 
profane.  In Ricoeur’s discussion of sanction, rehabilitation, and pardon in The Just, he 
stresses that pardon, in particular, “…stems from an economy of the gift, in virtue of the 
logic of superabundance that articulates it and that has to be opposed to the logic of 
equivalence presiding over justice.”15 For Duffy, religious metaphor, Ricoeur’s 
appropriation of Rawls’ Veil, and the ideal of the supra-ethical combine to reconcile society, 
influence politics, and build a new “moral order.”16 The moral order as conceived by 
Ricoeur is driven by the spirit of charity and empathy. While Duffy notes that “Societies 
coming out of violent conflict need more than laws, agreements, and contracts” and 
idealizes the transformative power of love, readers should be careful not to ignore the 
profane.17 Just institutions can work to secure that memory and mourning remains 
transparent, for “morality is held to constitute only a limited, but legitimate and even 
indispensable, actualization of the ethical aim, and ethics in this sense would then 
encompass morality.18 Ricoeur would suggest that just laws, agreements, and contracts 
become manifest as the dross of phronesis. Ricoeur’s avoidance of totality (be it political or 
religious) speaks to his ideal of reconciled human beings living and working in concert. 
 
Duffy does admit to the “utilitarian value” of reconciliation, however, for post-conflict 
societies. She returns to a discussion of the mimetic arc as a mode of understanding, 
configuring, and re-configuring events (see discussion of mimesis, above). In order to better 
understand the descriptive power of the mimetic arc, it’s helpful to tie together Duffy’s 
discussion of aporias with earlier discussion of the twin concepts of ipse and idem. In 
Oneself as Another, attestation, or a belief in by the individual self, is the necessary starting 
point of hermeneutics. Narrative identity is formed from the dialectical tension between ipse 
(as selfhood, individuality, the who of our being) and idem (as sameness, the what of our 
being). The aporias here concerns problems of sameness and change over time and the 
problem of the other. While Ricoeur’s narrative identity goes some way in interpreting the 
conflicts and interactions of the who with the what, Duffy is able to somewhat address the 
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aporetic through the evangelical. Ultimately, the attested living, suffering human being 
confronts the past (bad memory), the present, and the other through the praxis of 
reconciliation and pardon.  Ricoeur points to how such a release from “bad memory” will 
transpire. In Memory, History, Forgetting, “just memory” allows guilt to be assuaged so that 
a new beginning (commencement) appears. The perpetrated act must be remembered to be 
forgotten; i.e., the guilt arising from the remembered act is forgotten, not the act itself. Only 
the victim can forgive, and by so doing frees him or herself from a painful, burdensome 
past. Forgiveness has to be unconditional for it to free the actors and restore the ability to 
act as autonomous agents.19 For Duffy, a social realm freed from guilt and sharing in just 
memory through patience and love holds the promise of orienting post-conflict societies 
towards re-figured futures. 
 
As she concludes in Chapter Six, both John Paul II and Ricoeur shared in a hopeful vision 
of re-figured futures marked by “…peace and a civilization of love.”20 Duffy suggests that 
John Paul II may even have been enlightened by Ricoeur’s pedagogy of pardon as “John 
Paul II sought to lead Catholic Christians into the third millennium,”21 which involve 
previous discussions of just memory and forgiveness as addressed in Incarnationis 
mysterium. Rightly, Duffy realizes that the hermeneutic imperative of Ricoeur’s work 
requires a degree of archaeology to bridge the philosophical and the theological. In the 
middle of the bridge stands the human being struggling to narratively construct meaning. 
Duffy alludes throughout her work to the absolute need of human beings to achieve identity 
and seek reconciliation despite the aporetic nature of temporal existence. Developed by 
Ricoeur in Time and Narrative, we validate our humanity and commonality through the 
narrative act and time and narrative cannot be separated. Augustine could never move 
beyond the contradiction between a soul distended in time (distentio animi) and the capacity 
of the human being to act (intentio) in time. We seek to escape our connection to time by 
acting toward a future. That future toward which we act inevitably becomes part of our past, 
and the effort to escape begins anew. For Ricoeur, Augustine’s discordant concordance 
narrows the horizons of the acting human being. Ricoeur’s particular genius (which 
becomes particularly significant in Duffy) was to add Aristotle’s emplotment to the mix.  
“We tell stories,” Ricoeur wrote, “because in the last analysis human lives need and merit 
being narrated.”22 Ricoeur sought to establish a correlation and dialogical relationship 
between the poetics of narrativity (Aristotle) and the aporetics of temporality (Augustine) in 
such a way that human beings can meaningfully address the past and claim dignity, self-
esteem, and hope. Having claimed hope, human beings bound in solicitude achieve 
communitarian unity and can envision a future of just institutions. In the end, Duffy sees 
this as Ricoeur’s legacy of giving “expression to nothing less than the heart’s profound 
longing.”23  
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One note regarding Duffy’s conclusion needs to be noted. She notes that the Catholic 
Church moved began to favor the problem of how to secure peace post bellum rather than 
focusing upon Just War Theory through the 1963 encyclical Pacem in Terris. The 
encyclical never directly confronts Just War Theory, and I fear that readers unfamiliar with 
Ricoeur will retroactively believe that Ricoeur spent much time on the subject (which he 
didn’t), and readers should reflect upon Ricoeur’s discussion of the abuses of memory in 
Chapter Two of Memory, History, Forgetting. “Bad” memory can easily be employed to 
justify the worst excesses. Though I sympathize with the spirit of her argument, Duffy’s 
connection of Just War Theory, jus post bellum, and Ricoeur is problematic without a great 
deal more development. I note this for three reasons. First, I believe that Duffy’s argument 
remains coherent just as presented in the first five chapters. In fact, §114 of Pacem in Terris 
could be incorporated easily. “There is general agreement—or at least should be—that 
relations between States, as between individuals, must be regulated not by armed force, but 
in accordance with the principles of right reason: the principles, that is, of truth, justice and 
vigorous and sincere co-operation.” From here it is a short leap to the economy of the gift as 
Duffy presents it. Second, a distinction needs to be made between post-conflict (unless 
Duffy wishes to engage the incredibly acerbic discussion of how the Troubles constitutes a 
just or unjust war) and post-war. In particular, jus ad bellum and jus in bello (the right to go 
to war and right conduct within war, respectively) are assumed in most discussions of jus 
post bellum.24 It’s safe to say that every culture has sought a justification to violence 
through a consensus of how and even if violence will be mitigated. Duffy is consistent if the 
just war theorizing on Augustine, Gratian, Tertullian, Aquinas, et al. is included in the 
catalog of wrongs which John Paul II sought to redress, and not much else is needed. 
Finally, the larger problem of the conduct of war and violence (whether “legitimate” or not) 
for Christians is problematic at best. Succinctly, the problem involves questions of theodicy 
(involving God’s morality, power, justice, and providence) and the fracture with Christian 
ethical values (the teachings and examples of Jesus, striving for the common good, etc.). 
While Augustine (Contra Faustum, CFXXII, 74-79, especially) sought to reconcile tensions 
between precepts of the Old and New Testaments and Aquinas incorporated Aristotle’s 
teleology of the common good, the problem of licit violence within a Christian context 
remains. Ricoeur’s exploration of the ethical danger of violence as an act that violates the 
power-to-do others and his warnings of the abuse of history make the discussion of Just War 
within the context of a pedagogy of pardon unnecessary and ultimately counter-
productive.25 
 
Duffy’s admirable presentation of the hermeneutical arc and the relationship to 
reconciliation and hope present a valuable opportunity for inter-disciplinary exploration of 
commencement through the works of Arendt (to whom I’ll restrict my observations, as 
Derrida and Lévinas aren’t explicitly explored by Duffy). As Duffy notes, Arendt and 
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Ricoeur shared a belief that forgiveness was a necessary step in breaking cycles of violence. 
As noted above, being freed from guilt allows the acting human being to refigure the future. 
Arendt’s ideal of promise (and here the connection to hope is not untoward) begins with 
forgiveness and, with Ricoeur, the act of forgiveness unburdens guilt and allows the acting 
being to move forward. Forgiveness is directed at the past, promise looks to the future. As 
she explains in The Human Condition, we form our identities through the capacity of 
promise keeping, which irrevocably ties us to others in commencement.26 Unlike Ricoeur, 
Arendt sees the utilitarian aspect of forgiveness as necessary for substantive breaks with 
painful history. Punishment serves a therapeutic function in Arendt. Both punishment and 
forgiveness share in that “they attempt to put an end to something that without interference 
could go on endlessly.”27 For Arendt, the individual human being can forgive that which 
can be forgiven, but “radical evil” (as developed by Kant in Religion within the Bounds of 
Reason Alone) demands forgiveness that human beings cannot provide.28 At this point of 
departure, Ricoeur’s “economy of the gift” effectively calls for a forgiveness of the 
unforgivable for commencement to occur.29 In Memory, History, Forgetting Ricoeur links 
Arendt’s “promise” to the political, while forgiveness’ “relation to love keeps it at a 
distance from the political.”30 From here Duffy effectively connects Ricoeurian solicitude 
with the eschatological imperative, but Arendt’s therapeutic concerns with punishment 
remain in the background. Related directly to Duffy’s argument, John Hatch has written an 
exceptional study focused upon post-conflict reconciliation in South Africa.31 Hatch notes 
that the “value of religion…lies not in guiding direct action, but in providing a background 
orientation that checks the push of power in the pragmatic realm of politics.”32 The 
transformative relationship of the spiritual to the political (giving prominence to one over 
the other) opens a complimentary and powerful opportunity to further hone Duffy’s thesis. 
 
Finally, an inter-disciplinary approach to Duffy’s exploration of the production of historical 
narrative (through oral and written projects such as An Crann or the Healing through 
Remembering Project) can be meaningfully connected with Ricoeur’s historical 
sensibilities. When Duffy uses the term “silences” in regard to historical memory, she points 
to one of the fundamental problems of remembered time: are we forgetting something that 
shouldn’t be forgotten? While Ricoeur rejected the notion of a universal history or that as 
yet undiscovered gems of historical knowledge can yield “facts” about the world, he 
believed that historiography held the promise of being able to confront potentially flawed 
memory—collective and individual. Any representation of the past is a reconstruction of the 
past, and will remain interpretive. As Marc Bloch (to whom Ricoeur extended a great deal 
of respect) noted, “The good historian is like a giant of the fairy tale. He knows that 
wherever he catches the scent of human flesh, there his quarry lies.”33 Throughout his life 
Ricoeur was troubled by the abuse inherent in the selective nature of memory. Just memory 
called for active archaeology and (in Duffy) An Crann, Healing through Remembering, and 
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other narrative and oral histories point to the quarry of historical inquiry as well as a 
warning to be wary of what is being recorded and by whom. The tendency of many to “opt-
out” (or, worse, to be ignored) during tribunals and hearings leaves substantial gaps in the 
historical record. Just memory demands that we look for “silences” in the historical record 
as surely as we critically examine that which is not silent. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, after 
Ricoeur, believed that conscientious historians explain history as best they can, but 
inevitably have to contend with silences.34 Silences take several forms. Some events take 
prominence over others that may have been or are deemed secondary. Records can be lost 
or destroyed. Those recording history choose the best story to present. Together, the most 
insidious danger of silences is when the historical narrative becomes “an idol” (to borrow a 
common term) and forms the basis of a society’s reified understanding of the past.  
 
Duffy’s Pedagogy of Pardon reverberates with the immediacy of addressing these silences 
in the hope of commencement. “True peace, therefore necessitates the evolution of ‘a 
culture of just memory’.”35 The “good life” understood in terms of reciprocity, self-esteem, 
and the concomitant hope of just institutions can only be reached in such a culture. Whereas 
Ricoeur never fully works through the aporia of the Other, the supra-ethical as advanced by 
Duffy allows for a less fragmented vision of the attested self living in accord with the Other. 
For Duffy, Ricoeur provides the tools, faith provides the impetus.  
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